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This paper mainly conducts an empirical study of the term structure of the 
Shanghai  office  rental  market.  Based  on  555  executed  contracts  in  the 
Shanghai office rental market from 2005 to 2008, the building quality and 
micro location are controlled, which are generally omitted in previous studies, 
through ranking of buildings and dividing the sample into 11 small central 
business  districts  (CBDs).  The  empirical  results  show  that  there  is  a 
downward term structure in the Shanghai market, but it is not very consistent 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As the financial centre of China, Shanghai is experiencing high-speed growth in the 
office rental market. Although numerous papers in real estate finance have discussed 
the factors that determine lease rates, there is no conclusive result yet. Among the 
different research interests in determining lease rates, the question of whether there is 
a term structure in rent that is similar to that in interest rates is not yet fully explored.  
Grenadier (1995) constructs endogenous processes for rent, supply, and asset values 
by using fundamental economic uncertainty and competitiveness between individual 
and value-maximizing firms. The conclusion is that for a market in which the supply 
has recently increased, there is a downward-sloping term structure for lease rates. On 
the contrary, there is an upward-sloping term structure for a market experiencing a 
severe economic depression. Slade (2000) uses the rental data of office properties in 
the Phoenix metropolitan area to investigate the office rental determinants during 
market decline and recovery, and finds that the economic cycle indeed greatly affects 
the rental rates. In the paper, Slade focuses on the rental area which has a similar 
pattern as that of the lease term. Buetow & Albert (1998) show that renewal options 
in real estate leases have a significant value and demonstrate ways to estimate the 
value  of  embedded  options  in  lease  contracts.  Along  this  line,  Grenadier  (2001) 
extends  the  perfect  competition  model  of  the  term  structure  to  an  oligopolistic 
property  market  model  and  also  provides  valuation  formulas  for  many  common 
leasing arrangements, such as forward leases, leases with cancellation or renewal 
options  and  indexed  leases.  Gunnelin  and  Söderberg  (2003)  first  estimate  the 
different term structures of lease rates in the Stockholm CBD office rental market 
from 1977-1991. Using 15 years of data, term structure is estimated by year and 
finally, they identify 15 consecutive term structures. In the 15 years, 7 years of data 
show a significant term structure. As well, the estimated term structure can predict 
future  rental  levels  to  a  certain  degree.  Moreover,  the  studied  period  includes  a 
pronounced boom and bust phase, which is used to evaluate the term structure in 
different stages of the property cycle. 
 
Englund, Gunnelin and Söderberg (2002) consider a very special lease; an upward-
only adjusting lease,  which is very common in the United Kingdom (UK). They 
derive a model which takes into account the expected growth and volatility of asset 
service flow, and come to the conclusion that the upward-only lease  will have a 
substantial effect on the initial rent. 
 
Clapham  and  Gunnelin  (2003)  extend  the  term  structure  model  by  deriving  an 
equilibrium  relationship  in  a  general  continuous  time  setting  in  which  the  short 
rentals  and  interest  rates  are  stochastic.  Similar  to  the  expectation  hypothesis  of 
interest  rates,  the  objective  expectation  about  future  rentals  can  mislead  the 
interpretation  of  the  term  structure.  The  effect  of  risk  aversion  and  interest  rate 
uncertainty on equilibrium should be taken into consideration. Simulations are done 
to show that different combinations of risk aversion and interest rates can lead to 
quite different patterns of the term structure, which means that there are more than 
three types of patterns as described by Grenadier (1995). Is There a Term Structure?    25 
    
 
Englund et al. (2004) use 4000 office rental agreements in the three largest cities of 
Sweden to investigate the importance of lease terms on rent determination. They 
show that the indices can be substantially distorted if the term of lease is not taken 
into  consideration.  Furthermore,  since  the  term  structure  is  determined  by 
expectations on future spot rentals, it should be taken into consideration whether the 
forward rentals implicit in the term structure are good estimators of the future spot 
rentals. However, they show that the forward rents have only relatively weak power 
in prediction. 
 
Along the same line, Bond, Loizou and McAllister (2008) has completed empirical 
research on commercial property in the UK to investigate the term structure. In their 
paper, they focus on the lease length and initial lease rates in the London office 
market  from  1994  to  2004.  In  their  regression  model,  size,  location,  quality  of 
building, year of origination, timing of lease breaks, and lease term are taken into 
consideration. They find that the term structure of the initial lease rates is upward 
sloping and this trend does not change over time. This result is quite robust even 
when they controlled the micro-location and tenant credit rating as well as potential 
endogeneity.  This  result  is  not  consistent  with  Grenadier  (2001),  but  with  the 
findings by Clapham and Gunnelin (2003).  
 
In this paper, the primary focus is on the term structure in the Shanghai office rental 
market. This is the  first paper that studies the term  structure of the office rental 
market in China, which will act as a source for international comparison and provide 
a better understanding of the theoretical model. The remainder of this paper is as 
follows. Section 1 will provide a discussion of our dataset, and how we choose and 
use the variables. Section 2 presents the empirical models and details the differences 
between them. Section 3 gives the empirical results and interpretation. Finally, the 
conclusion is in Section 4.   
 
 
2.  Data 
 
The dataset consists of the final executed 555 Grade A office leases in Shanghai 
from 2005 to 2008. Here, Grade A office is defined as within the CBD, modern with 
high quality finishing, flexible layout, large floor plates, spacious, well decorated 
lobbies and circulation areas, effective central air-conditioning,  good lift services 
zoned for passengers and goods deliveries, professional management, and parking 
facilities.  These  offices  are  located  in  all  of  the  CBDs  in  Shanghai,  so  it  is 
representative for the entire Shanghai office market. One of the possible limitations 
of this dataset is that most of the leases run for 2-3 years, some for 1 year and a few 
for 5 years. However, the issue is not the incompleteness of data collection, but the 26    Fang and Lu 
 
characteristics of office building leases in China.
1 According to Hines (2000), the 
typical length of lease in Asia generally runs from 1 to 3 years, 5 to 10 years in North 
America,  and  for  European,  Middle  Eastern,  and  African  leases,  somewhere  in 
between. Office leases in England, Scotland, and Wales are generally 5, 10, or 15 
years. It can also be seen from Bond, Loizou and McAllister (2008) that the dataset 
used in their paper, the UK Commercial Property Leases, is typically a 10, 15 or 20 
year  lease.  The  potential  problem  is  that,  due  to  lack  of  observations  in  other 
maturity  leases,  conclusions  about  the  term  structure  should  be  made  carefully, 
especially when 80-90% of the sample are typical leases.  
 
The uniform grade of the office provides a simple way to control the building quality. 
However, since there is no official definition of Grade A office buildings and even if 
two buildings are both Grade A, there are differences in quality. In order to control 
the effects of building quality on rent, we divided all the buildings into 4 groups, 
from rank 1 to rank 4
2, in which 1 is the best quality and 4 represents the worst 
quality. 
 
Although all of these buildings are in 1 of the 7 CBDs in Shanghai, there are some 
differences among the CBDs which may affect the rent. The location of the property 
was grouped according to the CBD areas, but not the official districts. To control the 
location factor, each district was treated as a dummy variable as well as with respect 
to the interactive terms of location and building quality. There are 11 groups of the 
office-cluster areas, by which we can control the effects of location and guarantee 
that in the same area, buildings that are equally ranked have nearly the same rent. 
This is very important because in our dataset, there are some samples located in a 
high-tech park  where the rent is  much lower than that  in the  CBD even  if both 
buildings are ranked 1. 
 
A significant change in the dataset occurs in 2008 when the rent was based on the 
Renminbi (RMB) instead of US dollars as in prior contracts. Since most of the Grade 
A  office  lessees  were  international  companies,  the  US  dollar-based  rent  was 
convenient for them. However, in 2008, the RMB exchange rate against US dollar 
greatly appreciated over the past two years (about 15%) and the lessors wanted to 
reduce their losses and exchange rate risks, so they changed the rent and based it on 
the RMB. For us, this created a problem in deciding whether all of the US dollar-
based  rentals  should  be  converted  into  RMB  or  vice  versa.  We  chose  the  latter, 
because to convert data, the exact date of the signed contract was required, but we 
only had data from 2008. 
 
                                                           
1  The most frequent lease term in Gunnelin and Söderberg’s dataset is 1 to 3 years. However, 
it  is  10  to  15  years  in  Bond,  Loizou  and  McAllister’s  data  set.  This  shows  the  different 
characteristics of each nation’s office property market.  
2  Actually, we did not do this ranking job by ourselves. Here, we would like to thank Zhang 
Dong, a professional trader in the Shanghai office rental market, for his immense help in 
ranking all of the buildings. As well, to avoid unnecessary confusion, we did not divide the 
ranking into too many groups.  Is There a Term Structure?    27 
    
No option clause is considered in this paper for two reasons: one, it is very rare 
(about 10 cases in all) that there is an option; two, the option can have a significant 
value, which may affect the final analysis result. Since the lease term (1-6 years and 
most of them are 2 and 3 years) in Shanghai is relatively shorter than that of the UK 
(which is 10 and 15 years), then the options in the contract, such as a break out 
option or upward only rent is not that important because the lessee and lessor would 
have the opportunity to adjust their contract within a short period of time. 
 
2.1  Variables and descriptive statistics 
 
We collected the following variables from the contracts. The variables are described 
in Table 1. 
 
Instead of using the consumer price index (CPI) as the price deflator, the rent is 
deflated by the real estate price index of the office rental market  which is  more 
reliable in capturing the price changes. This index data is found on the website of the 
Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau.
3  
 
Table 1  Description of the Data Set 
Variables  Definition 
district  The location of the property 
arealeased   Leased area in the contract 
year  Year that the contract was signed  
Rentfee  Rental fee in the contract. It is not a necessary part of the 
contract and mostly seen in the rank 1 properties 
rank  The  rank  of  the  property  quality,  1  represents  the  highest 
quality and 4 represents the lowest quality 
leaseterm  The lease term in the executed contract  
leaseterm2  Square of lease term 
lnarea  Log of the leased area 
lnrent  Log of the rental contract, the rent is measured by USD per 
square meter per month 
xyear_2006 ~ xyear_2008  The dummy variable of the year 
xyeaXlea_2006  ~ 
xyeaXlea_2008 
The dummy variable of the interaction term between lease 
term and year 
qyeaXlea_2006  The  dummy  variable  of  the  interaction  term  between 
leaseterm2 and year 
_Idistrict_2 ~ _Idistrict_11  The dummy variables of the district 
_Irank_2 ~ -Irank_4  The dummy variable of the rank, rank 1 is the omitted group 
_IdisXran_2_2  ~ 
_IdisXran_11_4 




                                                           
3  The website is http://www.statssh.gov.cn/2003shtj/tjnj/nje07.htm?d1=2007tjnje/e0812.htm 28    Fang and Lu 
 
The rental fee in contracts is collected to control differences in the standard contract. 
In our dataset, it is rare that a contract would have a rental fee and those with rental 
fees are rank 1 office contracts. The rental fee was used as a variable to control the 
building quality. Actually, we can show in the following regression that the rental fee 
variable just slightly affects the model. Details will be discussed later. 
 
Below, Table 2 shows the distribution of leases by lease length and year. As we 
discussed in the data section, the lease term in China is generally 2-3 years and few 
are above 4 year maturity, in contrast to the 10-20 years in the UK, and 1-3 years in 
Sweden. We can see from Table 2 that the patterns for lease length stay the same. 
 
Table 2  Lease Term Distribution of Contracts from 2005 to 2008 
Year/lease term  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  4  5  6  Total 
2005  3     22     24           49 
2006  8    93  2  150  1  1  2  257 
2007  1  1  46    96    3    147 
2008  3    36    61    2    102 
Total  15  1  197  2  331  1  6  2  555 
Note:  The  term  is  measured  by  year  and  the  numbers  in  the  table  are  the  number  of 
observations in the total sample. 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the lease contracts in the sample. The total 
sample is grouped by districts and year. The following variables are reported in the 
table: average rent, standard deviation of rent, average lease term, standard deviation 
of the lease term, average lease area, standard deviation of the lease area, average 
rental fee and standard deviation of rental fee. The rent in this table has been deflated 
by the real estate price index. The “count” variable is the number of leases. The 
blank in the table is because there is no observation for that year or district. We can 
see from the table that the rent in 2008 is much higher than that for other years, from 
about 22 in 2005-2007 to 34 in 2008. 
 
2.2  Empirical model 
 
In this paper, the log of the rent is the explained variable and lease term, log of the 
lease area, interaction term of rank and district, and dummy variable of the year are 
the explanatory variables. This regression model is mainly based on Gunnelin and 
Söderberg (2003)’s model. The model is as follows:  
 
11




ln( ) ln( ) 2 *_Idistrict _




j k j k
rent leasearea leaseterm leaseterm i
j k j k u




= + + + +
+ + + +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
                                                                                                                        
(1) 
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where ln(rent) is the log of the deflated contract rent; leasearea is the log of the lease 
area; leaseterm is the contract lease maturity; leaseterm2 is the square of the lease 
term; _Idistrict is the dummy variable of the location; xyear is the dummy variable 
of  year; _Irank_k is the dummy variable of the building rank; _Irank_j_k is the 
dummy variable of the interaction term of rank and districts.  
 
This equation is used to verify whether there is a hump in the term structure. We 
have merged all the data from the different years and estimated the equation while 
keeping the year dummy to control the difference between the years. We have also 
estimated the equation year by year to see whether there is a different term structure 
in different years. 
 
An alternative equation is not to include the quadratic form of the lease term. The 
reason is that the lease term in our data set is discrete and only gets 1-6 years so the 
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j k j k
rent leasearea leaseterm i
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= + + +
+ + + +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
      (2) 
  The empirical result of using equations (1.1) and (1.2) are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 









(year=2008)  Model 1 (total) 
Dependent 
variable 
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
leaseterm  -0.13(0.733)  0.685(0.045)**  1.022(0)**  -0.07(0.657)  0.629(0)** 
leaseterm2  0.009(0.909)  -0.15(0.005)**  -0.21(0)**  0.016(0.57)  -0.13(0)** 
ln(area)  0.026(0.389)  -0.16(0.009)**  -0.03(0.239)  -0.05(0.007)**  -0.09(0.001)* 
_IdisXra~1_4           
_IdisXra~1_3        -0.28(0.314)  -0.78(0.259) 
_IdisXra~1_2    -0.94(0.101)      -0.45(0.627) 
_IdisXra~0_4  -0.56(0.017)**  0.213(0.63)      0.231(0.285) 
_IdisXra~0_3           
_IdisXra~0_2           
_IdisXra~9_4  -0.55(0.07)*  0.793(0.431)  -0.61(0.26)    -0.22(0.74) 
_IdisXra~9_3      -0.19(0.736)     
_IdisXra~9_2           
_IdisXra~8_4    0.331(0.568)    0.513(0.112)   
_IdisXra~8_3      -0.11(0.611)    -0.24(0.378) 
_IdisXra~8_2  -0.30(0.282)  0.052(0.931)  0.253(0.454)  0.306(0.318)  0.434(0.545) 
_IdisXra~7_4    0.469(0.444)  -0.83(0.021)**    -0.60(0.41) 
_IdisXra~7_3      -0.89(0.025)**    -1.01(0.146) 
_IdisXra~7_2           
_IdisXra~6_4    0.328(0.711)       
_IdisXra~6_3      0.241(0.295)  -0.05(0.825)  -0.40(0.457) 
_IdisXra~6_2           
(Continue …) 
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(year=2008)  Model 1 (total) 
Dependent 
variable  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
_IdisXra~5_4    -0.39(0.674)  -0.87(0.047)**  -0.46(0.111)  -1.07(0.114) 
_IdisXra~5_3  0.510(0.137)  -0.30(0.761)  -0.68(0.162)  -0.43(0.214)  -1.01(0.12) 
_IdisXra~5_2    -0.08(0.938)       
_IdisXra~4_4  -0.18(0.433)    -0.59(0.275)    -0.76(0.297) 
_IdisXra~4_3  0.365(0.161)    -0.58(0.257)  0.057(0.872)  -0.82(0.205) 
_IdisXra~4_2    -0.54(0.65)  0.008(0.985)  0.139(0.531)  -0.35(0.282) 
_IdisXra~3_4      -0.17(0.662)     
_IdisXra~3_3    -1.09(0.276)    -0.36(0.224)  -0.54(0.178) 
_IdisXra~3_2           
_IdisXra~2_4    -0.25(0.79)  -0.67(0.23)  0.074(0.83)  -0.91(0.193) 
_IdisXra~2_3    -0.36(0.745)  -0.64(0.228)  -0.44(0.261)  -1.15(0.083) 
_IdisXra~2_2  0.168(0.397)  -0.69(0.543)  0.242(0.53)  -0.03(0.911)  -0.38(0.21) 
_Irank_4  -0.50(0.008)**  -0.54(0.536)  0.221(0.616)  -0.77(0.002)**  0.261(0.692) 
_Irank_3  -1.06(0)**  -0.20(0.833)  0.301(0.527)  -0.28(0.398)  0.556(0.372) 
_Irank_2  -0.44(0.004)**  0.237(0.826)  -0.01(0.955)  -0.38(0.05)**  0.096(0.681) 
_Idistric~11      0.670(0.036)  0.183(0.403)  0.795(0.205) 
_Idistric~10           
_Idistrict_9    -0.34(0.724)  0.867(0.076)*  0.257(0.165)  0.643(0.291) 
_Idistrict_8    -0.02(0.937)  0.373(0.03)**  0.057(0.776)  0.386(0.086) 
_Idistrict_7    -0.14(0.706)  0.815(0.02)**  0.338(0.066)*  0.828(0.234) 
_Idistrict_6    0.296(0.572)      0.629(0.175) 
_Idistrict_5  -0.00(0.977)  0.328(0.733)  0.976(0.032)**  0.442(0.124)  1.128(0.078) 
_Idistrict_4  -0.54(0.024)**  0.418(0.649)  0.937(0.052)*  0.152(0.6)  1.111(0.082) 
_Idistrict_3    0.884(0.335)  0.428(0.163)  0.217(0.361)  0.376(0.284) 
_Idistrict_2  -0.24(0.2)  0.688(0.488)  1.022(0.046)**  0.516(0.142)  1.401(0.032) 
xyear_2006          -0.12(0.196) 
xyear_2007          0.170(0.124) 
xyear_2008          0.458(0)** 
_cons  4.023(0)**  3.278(0.004)**  1.602(0.006)**  4.023(0)**  2.208(0.001)** 
Prob > F  0  0  0  0  0 
R-squared  0.8679  0.2603  0.6382  0.7879  0.3438 
Adj R-squared  0.7954  0.1622  0.5447  0.7144  0.2981 
 
 
The results above demonstrate that the term structure is a hump in 2006, 2007 and 
the merged total sample, while no term structure can be identified in 2005 and 2008. 
The positive sign on the lease term and negative sign on the square lease illustrate 
that occupiers pay a higher initial rent for a longer term if the lease maturity is less 
than 3 years, and a lower rent for a longer term if the term is more than 3 years. The 
highest rent has a maturity of 2, 2.5, and 3 years respectively in 2006, 2007 and the 
total sample. This coincides with the most frequently seen contracts in the rental 
market. A possible reason is that the office rental market in Shanghai is a seller's 
market because a report from DTZ shows that there has been an upward trend in the 
Shanghai office rental market from 2005. Actually, we can see from the year dummy 
that the rent increases significantly in 2008 and significant at the 1% level, while in 
2006 and 2007, there are no considerable changes.   
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The  coefficient  of  the  lease  area  is  not  significant  in  all  of  the  years.  It  has  an 
expected negative sign in 2006, 2008 and the total sample, but not in 2005 and 2007. 
The coefficients of the dummy variables are also inconsistent in all of the samples. 
There are some significant variables, such as ranks and districts in 2005, 2007 and 
2008, but none of them stands significant in 2006 and the total sample. However, 
although the variables are all insignificant, we cannot disregard them because they 
are jointly significant at the 1% level. (P-value=0, F value= 4.28) 
 









(year=2008)  Model 2 (total) 
Dependent 
variable 
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
leaseterm  -0.09(0.13)  -0.22(0.037)**  -0.22(0) **  0.019(0.605)  -0.16(0.001) ** 
ln(area)  0.027(0.373)  -0.15(0.013) **  -0.04(0.145)  -0.05(0.007) **  -0.09(0.001) ** 
_IdisXra~1_4           
_IdisXra~1_3        -0.27(0.341)  -0.86(0.225) 
_IdisXra~1_2    -1.06(0.069)      -0.55(0.558) 
_IdisXra~0_4  -0.56(0.015) **  -0.01(0.969)      0.145(0.508) 
_IdisXra~0_3           
_IdisXra~0_2           
_IdisXra~9_4  -0.53(0.051) *  0.636(0.533)  -0.69(0.262)  0.233(0.194)  -0.43(0.528) 
_IdisXra~9_3      -0.30(0.645)     
_IdisXra~9_2           
_IdisXra~8_4    0.296(0.615)    0.454(0.135)   
_IdisXra~8_3      -0.19(0.465)    -0.31(0.27) 
_IdisXra~8_2  0.211(0.378)  0.034(0.955)  0.273(0.481)  0.257(0.379)  0.433(0.554) 
_IdisXra~7_4    0.431(0.488)  -1.11(0.007) **    -0.66(0.371) 
_IdisXra~7_3      -1.11(0.014) **    -1.11(0.119) 
_IdisXra~7_2           
_IdisXra~6_4    0.316(0.725)       
_IdisXra~6_3      0.060(0.816)  -0.05(0.824)  -0.43(0.434) 
_IdisXra~6_2           
_IdisXra~5_4    -0.39(0.68)  -0.88(0.099) *  -0.47(0.101)  -1.07(0.122) 
_IdisXra~5_3    -0.19(0.848)  -0.65(0.27)  -0.38(0.254)  -1.04(0.116) 
_IdisXra~5_2    -0.06(0.955)  0.102(0.836)     
_IdisXra~4_4  -0.18(0.424)    -0.82(0.163)    -0.77(0.297) 
_IdisXra~4_3  0.366(0.152)  -0.09(0.925)  -0.74(0.183)  0.097(0.78)  -0.89(0.181) 
_IdisXra~4_2  0.514(0.125)  -0.52(0.67)    0.134(0.544)  -0.33(0.311) 
_IdisXra~3_4      -0.05(0.907)     
_IdisXra~3_3    -1.09(0.284)    -0.32(0.265)  -0.60(0.142) 
_IdisXra~3_2           
_IdisXra~2_4    -0.18(0.849)  -0.67(0.294)  0.063(0.854)  -0.87(0.221) 
_IdisXra~2_3    -0.22(0.844)  -0.47(0.433)  -0.39(0.299)  -1.13(0.093) * 
_IdisXra~2_2  0.685(0.028) **  -0.57(0.617)  0.269(0.539)  -0.02(0.928)  -0.34(0.275) 
(Continue …) 
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(year=2008)  Model 2 (total) 
Dependent 
variable 
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
_Irank_4  -0.50(0.007) **  -0.66(0.452)  0.335(0.506)   -0.76(0.002)  0.217(0.746) 
_Irank_3  -1.06(0) **  -0.33(0.73)  0.460(0.398)  -0.31(0.328)  0.584(0.358) 
_Irank_2  -0.96(0.003) **  0.167(0.878)  0.059(0.866)  -0.38(0.049) **  0.081(0.734) 
_Idistric~11      0.712(0.051) *  0.151(0.472)  0.886(0.166) 
_Idistric~10           
_Idistrict_9    -0.51(0.61)  0.985(0.077) *    0.661(0.287) 
_Idistrict_8  0.357(0.001) **  -0.06(0.852)  0.395(0.048)  0.053(0.79)  0.438(0.056) * 
_Idistrict_7    -0.26(0.504)  0.902(0.035) **  0.286(0.07) **  0.872(0.22) 
_Idistrict_6    0.170(0.748)      0.584(0.217) 
_Idistrict_5  0.503(0.003) **  0.175(0.858)  0.943(0.087) *  0.389(0.15)  1.14(0.08) ** 
_Idistrict_4  -0.54(0.021) **  0.275(0.767)  1.034(0.046) **  0.105(0.705)  1.13(0.081) * 
_Idistrict_3    0.891(0.338)  0.251(0.471)  0.169(0.443)  0.423(0.237) 
_Idistrict_2  -0.24(0.184)  0.521(0.604)  0.861(0.138)  0.463(0.169)  1.38(0.037) ** 
xyear_2006          -0.14(0.16) 
xyear_2007          0.158(0.162) 
xyear_2008          0.429(0) ** 
_cons  3.973(0) **  4.708(0) **  3.361(0) **  3.932(0) **  3.292(0) ** 
Prob > F  0  0.0002  0  0  0 
R-squared  0.8678  0.2341  0.5214  0.787  0.3157 
Adj R-squared  0.8017  0.1362  0.4028  0.717  0.2696 
 
 
ln(rent) is the log of the deflated contract rent; leasearea is the log of the contract 
lease area; leaseterm is the contract lease maturity; leaseterm2 is the square of the 
lease term; _Idistrict is the dummy variable of the location; xyear is the dummy 
variable  of    the  year;  _Irank_k  is  the  dummy  variable  of  the  building  rank; 
_Irank_j_k is the dummy variable of the interaction term of rank and districts. The 
value in the bracket is the P-value. The value denoted by ** is significant at the 5% 
level, and the value denoted by * is significant at the 10% level. 
 
The rental fee is not included in this regression model although we have this data, 
because  we  have  verified  that  the  “rentfee”  variable  only  slightly  numerically 
changes the coefficient, but does not affect the sign of the coefficient while reducing 
the adjusted R2. 
 
Without the quadratic form of the lease term, the results in Table 5 are similar to that 
of using equation (1). The reason is that the linear can be a good approximating 
function if the value is limited to a small interval. In our case, nearly 80% of our 
sample has a maturity of 2-3 years and the range of the lease term is 6, so it is not 
that plausible to assume that it has a quadratic form. Even if it really has a quadratic 34    Fang and Lu 
 
form, we can say that the linear model is suitable given our dataset, at least to some 
extent.  
 
ln(rent) is the log of the deflated contract rent; leasearea is the log of the contract 
lease area; leaseterm is the contract lease maturity; leaseterm2 is the square of the 
lease term; _Idistrict is the dummy variable of the location; xyear is the dummy 
variable of the year; _Irank_k is the dummy variable of the building rank; _Irank_j_k 
is the dummy variable of the interaction term of rank and districts. The value in the 
bracket is the P-value. The value denoted by ** is significant at the 5% level, and the 
value denoted by * is significant at the 10% level. 
 
The results in Table 5 show that the term structure has a downward slope in 2006, 
2007 and the merged total sample, while no term structure can be identified in 2005 
and 2008. In other words, if there is a pattern using the quadratic form, it would still 
have a pattern in the linear form, and vice versa. The negative sign on the lease term 
suggests that lessees pay a higher initial rent for a shorter term. It is contrary to the 
findings of Gunnelin and Söderberg (2003), and Bond, Loizou and McAllister (2008), 
in which both of them show an upward term structure in the UK and Sweden office 
rental markets. 
 
The coefficient of the lease area is not significant in some years. It has an expected 
negative sign in year 2006, 2008 and the total sample, but not in 2005 and 2007. The 
coefficients of the dummy variables are also inconsistent in all of the samples. Again, 
although the variables are all insignificant, we cannot disregard them because they 
are jointly significant at the 1% level. (P-value=0, F value= 5.29) 
 
Another model that should be considered, controls an interaction term between lease 
term and year.  
11




ln( ) ln( ) 2 *_Idistrict_
*xyear_ *_Irank_ *xyeaXle *qyeaXle *_Irank_ _
i
i
i k n m l
j k n m j k
rent leasearea leaseterm leaseterm i
j k j k u
β β β β θ
γ η ω ρ λ
=
= =
= + + + +
+ + + + + +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑










ln( ) ln( ) 2 *_Idistrict_
*xyear_ *_Irank_ *xyeaXle *_Irank_ _
i
i
i k n l
j k n j k
rent leasearea leaseterm leaseterm i
j k j k u
β β β β θ
γ η ω λ
=
= =
= + + + +
+ + + + +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
            (4)
 
   
where the xyeaXlea is the dummy variable of the interaction term between the lease 
term and year, and qyeaXlea is the dummy variable of the interaction term between 
leaseterm2 and year. 
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Table 6 contains the regression results using equations 3 and 4. With the interaction 
term, we allow the different years to have different term structures in one function. 
We can see that the coefficient of ln (area) is negative as expected. For model 3 that 
uses equation 3, the coefficient of the leaseterm, leaseterm2 and all of the interaction 
terms are insignificant, but they are jointly significant in all of the variables that 
contain the lease term. (F=8.6, p-value=0) Hence, there is some pattern underlying 
the data, but with this specification, we cannot determine the exact form. 
 
Based on the same rationale in equation 2, we run model 4 using equation 4. The 
coefficient of the lease term is small and insignificant at the 10% level. At the same 
time,  the  coefficient  of  the  interaction  term  between  lease  term  and  year  are  all 
insignificant, except for 2006. Therefore, we can only identify that there is a term 
structure  in  2006  and  no  statistical  support  for  other  years  with  respect  to  term 
structure. Most of the interaction terms between ranks and districts are insignificant, 
but again, they are jointly significant. Also, the term structure pattern is downwards.  
 
 
Table 6  The  Regression  Models  3  &  4:  Regression  ln(rent)  with  Lease 
term*year 
   Model 3 (using equation 3)  Model 4 (using equation 4) 
Dependent variable  Coef.  Coef. 
Lnarea  -0.06(0.024)* *  -0.08(0.002) ** 
Leaseterm  -0.15(0.887)  0.027(0.859) 
leaseterm2  0.058(0.803)   
xyear_2006  0.375(0.355)  0.625(0.126) 
xyear_2007  0.430(0.347)  0.686(0.137) 
xyear_2008  0.158(0.729)  0.295(0.525) 
xyeaXle~2006  -0.20(0.21)  -0.30(0.056) * 
xyeaXle~2007  -0.10(0.547)  -0.21(0.228) 
xyeaXle~2008  0.106(0.547)  0.038(0.831) 
qyeaXle~2006  -0.02(0.907)   
qyeaXle~2007  -0.29(0.226)   
qyeaXle~2008  -0.21(0.362)   
_IdisXra~1_4     
_IdisXra~1_3  -0.78(0.26)  -0.84(0.229) 
_IdisXra~1_2  -0.40(0.662)  -0.49(0.599) 
_IdisXra~0_4  0.172(0.427)  0.092(0.673) 
_IdisXra~0_3     
_IdisXra~0_2     
_IdisXra~9_4  -0.23(0.73)  -0.40(0.55) 
_IdisXra~9_3     
_IdisXra~9_2     
_IdisXra~8_4     
_IdisXra~8_3  -0.18(0.509)  -0.24(0.388) 
_IdisXra~8_2  0.494(0.489)  0.501(0.491) 
(Continue …) 
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Table 6  Continued 
   Model 3 (using equation 3)  Model 4 (using equation 4) 
Dependent variable  Coef.  Coef. 
_IdisXra~7_4  -0.68(0.35)  -0.75(0.309) 
_IdisXra~7_3  -1.00(0.149)  -1.10(0.119) 
_IdisXra~7_2     
_IdisXra~6_4     
_IdisXra~6_3  -0.40(0.447)  -0.44(0.42) 
_IdisXra~6_2     
_IdisXra~5_4  -1.13(0.094)  -1.15(0.095) * 
_IdisXra~5_3  -0.97(0.132)  -1.01(0.125) 
_IdisXra~5_2     
_IdisXra~4_4  -0.82(0.256)  -0.86(0.245) 
_IdisXra~4_3  -0.84(0.196)  -0.90(0.17) 
_IdisXra~4_2  -0.37(0.248)  -0.37(0.265) 
_IdisXra~3_4     
_IdisXra~3_3  -0.48(0.228)  -0.52(0.195) 
_IdisXra~3_2     
_IdisXra~2_4  -0.98(0.161)  -0.96(0.176) 
_IdisXra~2_3  -1.14(0.085)  -1.12(0.093) 
_IdisXra~2_2  -0.37(0.225)  -0.34(0.272) 
_Irank_4  0.298(0.649)  0.268(0.688) 
_Irank_3  0.544(0.381)  0.572(0.365) 
_Irank_2  0.086(0.711)  0.074(0.754) 
_Idistric~11  0.729(0.244)  0.807(0.204) 
_Idistric~10     
_Idistrict_9  0.618(0.308)  0.637(0.302) 
_Idistrict_8  0.314(0.164)  0.353(0.123) 
_Idistrict_7  0.791(0.254)  0.830(0.239) 
_Idistrict_6  0.602(0.193)  0.558(0.235) 
_Idistrict_5  1.095(0.086) *  1.112(0.086) * 
_Idistrict_4  1.082(0.089) *  1.109(0.087) * 
_Idistrict_3  0.350(0.316)  0.388(0.275) 
_Idistrict_2  1.377(0.034) **  1.367(0.039) 
_cons  2.016(0.008) **  2.800(0) ** 
Prob > F  0  0 
R-squared  0.3782  0.3297 
Adj R-squared  0.3259  0.2803 
 
 
ln(rent) is the log of the deflated contract rent; leasearea is the log of the contract 
lease area; leaseterm is the contract lease maturity; leaseterm2 is the square of the 
lease term; _Idistrict is the dummy variable of the location; xyear is the dummy 
variable  of    the  year;  _Irank_k  is  the  dummy  variable  of  the  building  rank; 
_Irank_j_k  is  the  dummy  variable  of  the  interaction  term  of  ranks  and  districts. 
xyeaXlea is the dummy variable of the interaction term between the lease term and 
year, and qyeaXlea is the dummy variable of the interaction term between leaseterm2 Is There a Term Structure?    37 
 
and  year.  The  value  in  the  bracket  is  the  P-value.  The  value  denoted  by  **  is 
significant at the 5% level, and the value denoted by * is significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion  
 
Since there is no previous research on the Shanghai office rental market, our study 
provides an international comparison and verifies the theory of the term structure. 
Based on 555 executed rental contracts of Shanghai Grade A office buildings, we 
have estimated the term structure of the Shanghai market from 2005 to 2008. With 
complete  information  of  the  contracts,  we  can  control  the  micro  location  and 
building quality, which are usually omitted in previous studies, in order to obtain a 
better  estimation.  Linear  and  quadratic  forms  of  the  lease  term  in  the  regression 
model are discussed, and both results are provided. A downward term structure of 
the Shanghai market in 2006 and 2007 is found, but there is no pattern in 2005 and 
2008. Constrained by the characteristics of the Shanghai office rental market where 
the  lease  term  is  typically  2-3  years  and  some  are  4-6  years,  the  term  structure 
estimation is more volatile as a consequence of the short term leases. More research 
in this area, such as international comparisons, will be of great help in understanding 
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